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Functional neurosurgery has seen a resurgence of interest in surgical treatments for
psychiatric illness. Deep brain stimulation (DBS) technology is the preferred tool in the
current wave of clinical experiments because it allows clinicians to directly alter the
functions of targeted brain regions, in a reversible manner, with the intent of correcting
diseases of the mind, such as depression, addiction, anorexia nervosa, dementia, and
obsessive compulsive disorder. These promising treatments raise a critical philosophical
and humanitarian question. “Under what conditions does ‘altering brain function’ qualify
as ‘mind control’?” In order to answer this question one needs a definition of mind control.
To this end, we reviewed the relevant philosophical, ethical, and neurosurgical literature in
order to create a set of criteria for what constitutes mind control in the context of DBS.
We also outline clinical implications of these criteria. Finally, we demonstrate the relevance
of the proposed criteria by focusing especially on serendipitous treatments involving DBS,
i.e., cases in which an unintended therapeutic benefit occurred. These cases highlight the
importance of gaining the consent of the subject for the new therapy in order to avoid
committing an act of mind control.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of deep brain stimulation (DBS) technology for the
treatment of psychiatric disorders is one of the most promising
and rapidly evolving areas of neurosurgical research (Abelson
et al., 2005; Mayberg et al., 2005; Lozano and Lipsman, 2013).
Nonetheless, in treating diseases of the mind by directly altering
the brain’s functioning, neurosurgeons, neurologists, psychia-
trists, and neuro-engineers run the risk of having this effort
interpreted as “mind control”. The purpose of this paper is to
address that specific concern in the context of DBS as it is
currently practiced and studied by providing a definition of “mind
control” that applies to DBS. That is, it is not intended to account
for the neurosurgeons staffing the wards of philosophical thought
experiments, whose powers to monitor and manipulate the brain
and their patients’ actions know no limits (Frankfurt, 1969).
Therefore, this paper seeks to cover adult patients who have
given informed consent for the treatment of their psychiatric or
neurologic illness.
By narrowing the scope of the article, we hope to maximize
its relevance while minimizing distracting (though philosoph-
ically interesting) cases. It is important to point out that the
conditions under discussion (adults, undergoing treatment, who
are capable of informed consent—including patients in states
such as locked-in syndrome) describe nearly all individuals
currently receiving DBS with the exception of those treated for
persistent vegetative state who lack the capacity to do anything,
including the ability to provide consent (Yamamoto et al.,
2010).
While the phrase “mind control” appears in the contemporary
literature discussing advances in DBS, it is often brought up
dismissively (Fins et al., 2009) or to catch the reader’s attention
(Horgan, 2004) but never with an accompanying formal defi-
nition. This is surprising, especially given a sophisticated and
robust ethics literature on DBS and psychiatry that deals with
related topics such as autonomy and informed consent (Bell et al.,
2009; Clausen, 2010), authenticity (Kraemer, 2013), enhancement
(Earp et al., 2014), and paternalism (Sjöstrand and Juth, 2014)
as well as unintended side effects of stimulation which alter
personality (Synofzik and Schlaepfer, 2008) and the way in which
DBS can influence patients’ perceptions of their identity (Lipsman
et al., 2009). Common features in this literature are an agreement
that autonomy is one of the key features that must be preserved in
the ethical practice of DBS and that this can been accomplished
in psychiatric patients through the practice of informed consent
(Dunn et al., 2011).
Beyond the contemporary neuro-ethics literature, mind
control has been the subject of numerous books and arti-
cles. One of the most thorough accounts of mind control
in the context of electrical stimulation of the human mind
appears in Elliot Valenstein’s aptly titled Brain Control (Valen-
stein, 1973). While Valenstein never supplies a formal defini-
tion of mind control, his primary argument focuses on discred-
iting the notion that a subject’s thoughts, choices or actions
could be manipulated through electrical stimulation of the
brain by giving a detailed account of its known capabilities
and limitations. Other discussions of mind control tend to
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have focused on psychopharmacologic methods or behavioral
methods of altering brain function, such as those employed in
the Central Intelligence Agency’s MKULTRA program (Senate,
1977).
Possibly the richest source of accounts of mind control is not
in the formal academic literature but in the online accounts of
individuals who claim to have witnessed acts of mind control or
who claim to be the target of mind control. In 2006 Bell et al.
provided a formal textual analysis of 10 characteristic examples.
Though the authors make it clear that they take these narratives
as signs of a delusional disorder and their analysis focused pri-
marily on the social network of the reports, they managed to
highlight several themes which the accounts shared. These shared
features help to establish an intuitive basis for what people believe
qualifies as mind control. The accounts often focused on: (1)
an authoritarian organization, such as “the police,” “the Dutch
government,” or “freemasonic intelligence agencies;” (2) employ-
ing some tool to augment brain function, such as a “frequency
weapon,” “brain implant” or “network of transmitters,” in order
to; (3) alter the subject’s thoughts or actions; (4) without the
subjects consent.
In proposing our criteria for mind control we retained and
formalized all of the common themes of the internet accounts
with the exception of the authoritarian organization. The author-
itarian element was dropped because the authors saw no rea-
son to exclude individuals acting alone from being capable of
committing an act of mind control. This is especially true in
the context of DBS where typically only one person or a few
people are responsible for the management of the treatment.
Therefore, we are proposing the phrase “mind control” be used
to describe instances when researchers or clinicians using DBS
intentionally alter patients’ behavior without consent and define
those instances using the criteria below.
After stating our formal criteria, we explain why the criteria
are limited to the subject’s behavior and neutral with regards
to the subject’s mental events during the act of mind control.
Then we provide test cases, which we argue intuitively do and
do not qualify as mind control and are correctly included and
excluded by the proposed criteria respectively. Next, we apply
the criteria to a non-obvious case of mind control. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of mind control in the context of
serendipitous therapy, i.e., cases where an individual sees a ther-
apeutic effect for a psychiatric illness for which he or she did
not give consent to have treated, such as in a patient treated
with DBS for anxiety who saw a remission of his alcoholism. We
argue that in such cases one should gain the individual’s explicit
consent for the treatment of the serendipitously improved co-
morbid illness or else one would qualify as committing an act of
mind control.
CRITERIA OF MIND CONTROL
Alteration of the brain’s functioning through direct stimulation
(either activation or suppression of action potentials) within the
subject’s brain qualifies as mind control when it meets all of the
following three criteria:
Result Criterion: Direct alteration of the brain’s function must
result in a behavioral change in the subject.
Consent Criterion: The behavioral change does not need to be
against the expressed will of the patient. The change must simply
have taken place without the subject’s consent.
Intent Criterion: The behavioral change must have been the
goal or the purpose of the person or the group controlling the
DBS. It cannot be an accident or an unintended consequence,
including side effects, of the stimulation.
In summary, mind control must alter the patient’s behavior
in an observable way without the subject’s consent and must be
enacted for that purpose.
LIMITING MIND TO BEHAVIOR
The above criteria rest on an assumption that the ultimate pur-
pose of “mind control” is to modify the behavior of an individual,
and the word “mind” is used in a folk psychology manner to
describe the intuitive mechanism of the control (Dennett, 1982).
It is important to spell out the definition of “mind control” in
the context of behavior because that is the relevant way DBS is
currently employed. This is because neurosurgeons and neurol-
ogists cannot make perfectly reliable a priori guesses about what
effect a given instance of DBS will have on a given patient. They
must therefore rely entirely on their observations of the patients’
behaviors, which include their patients’ reports.
To understand this point, consider that neurosurgeons have
a great deal of information about what parts of the brain are
associated with certain faculties, such as the formation and com-
prehension of speech, sensation of touch over the body, execution
of intended movement, and sight. Further, they know that the
destruction of these regions will leave the patient with a deficit
so protecting them during surgery is one of the surgeon’s highest
priorities. However, the surgeons cannot predict exactly where
these regions are located in specific patients based on previous
studies alone (Penfield and Perot, 1963; Kim et al., 2009). There-
fore, some neurosurgical cases are performed with the patient
awake so that he or she can report the sensations he or she
experiences when the neurosurgeon applies electric current to
the brain region of interest. Based on the patient’s reports, the
surgeon will individualize his approach in order to resect the
pathological tissue while sparing the functionally important, so
called eloquent, cortex. If the procedure were performed without
the patient’s behavioral feedback there would be a very high
probability that an important cortical region would be damaged
leaving the patient with a neurological deficit (Penfield and
Boldrey, 1937).
The same type of procedure is also essential to the practice
of DBS. For example patients must be closely observed intra-
operatively for behavioral signs, such as a reflexive smile, in
order for the surgical team to determine the effect of stimulation
(Okun et al., 2004; Haq et al., 2011). Once the electrode and
stimulator are implanted, specially trained neurologists adjust
the stimulation parameters and closely observe the effect on the
patient’s symptoms (Volkmann et al., 2006). Finally, patients must
be closely followed during treatment for signs of cognitive decline
(Parsons et al., 2006), mood disorders (Bejjani et al., 1999; Kuli-
sevsky et al., 2002), or other, sometimes serendipitous, behavioral
changes (Kuhn et al., 2007). In summary, the use of DBS relies
entirely on the patient’s behavior as the sole feedback mechanism
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for targeting the electrode as well for modifying the stimulation
parameters in order to achieve the desired effect. Because the
person or persons controlling the DBS rely on observation of
behavior, any instance of mind control using DBS would neces-
sarily rely entirely on the subject’s behavior. Therefore, a practical
definition of mind control can be limited solely to behavior
without directly addressing metaphysical questions related to the
mind itself.
OBVIOUS TEST CASES
Having proposed the criteria for mind control, it is important to
test them. This is best done by asking whether the criteria account
for cases of obvious mind control while excluding cases that are
obviously not mind control.
For a clear example of mind control, we must (fortunately)
look beyond the current practice of DBS into its murkier past.
One such case was published in 1963 in the journal Science
by a psychosurgery group working under Dr. Robert Heath at
Tulane University (Bishop et al., 1963). This article detailed
a “self-stimulation” experiment in which a 35 year old man
was implanted with electrodes in eight different brain struc-
tures, including in the head of the caudate, the septal area, and
the amygdala. These electrodes were labeled by researchers as
either “rewarding” or “aversive” and the subject was given a
lever and a button which, when operated, would activate one
of the electrodes. As the experiment proceeded, the researchers
varied the electrodes which the lever and button activated and
also varied the stimulation parameters delivered through the
electrodes.
This experiment was based on studies previously done in
rats, cats, dogs, goats, monkeys, and bottle nosed dolphins
(Olds, 1962) which had shown that the animals’ behavior
could be predictably controlled by placing stimulating elec-
trodes into “rewarding” and “aversive” regions of the brain and
then correlating stimulation through the electrodes to elements
of the animals’ environment. Therefore, the researchers had
good reason to anticipate specific behavioral responses in the
human subject. Further, at no point do the authors say that
the subject, who was referred to as “clearly nonnormal,” gave
consent for the experiment or understood why the experiment
was conducted.
Looking back to the proposed criteria for mind control, we
see that this case satisfies all three. First, electrical stimulation
of the brain was employed in a manner that clearly influenced
the subject’s behavior, satisfying the Result Criterion. Second, at
no point did the authors state that the patient gave consent
to have his behavior manipulated in this manner, satisfying the
Consent Criterion. Finally, the behavior change was anticipated by
the researchers controlling the stimulation of the subject’s brain,
satisfying the Intent Criterion.
Next, we must ask is there an example of altering brain func-
tion which obviously is not mind control and, also, is correctly
excluded by the Result, Consent, and Intent Criteria? Consider the
treatment of essential tremor with DBS. It is safe, effective, and
has been approved by the FDA (Koller et al., 2001). It is believed to
work through altering the function of the brain (more specifically
by causing a reversible, functional lesion (Grill et al., 2004) in
a malfunctioning part of the brain), ultimately permitting the
patient to accomplish routine daily activities free from the violent
hand tremors that are the hallmark of the disease. This relief of
symptoms is the direct result of the electrical pulses in the brain,
which alter its standard pattern of firing; however, it is not an
instance of mind control.
Why is DBS for the treatment of essential tremor not an
example of mind control? After all, it could be argued that one
is altering the behavior of the patient’s hands, from a tremulous
grasp to a stable grip, and that this was explicitly the purpose
of the individual programing the DBS device. However, while
this example meets the requirements of the Result Criterion
as well as the Intent Criterion, it fails to meet the Consent
Criterion because in all cases of DBS for essential tremor, all
patients give consent for stimulation with the explicit desire
to see this behavioral change. Interestingly, DBS for essential
tremor could be thought of as “mind freedom,” as opposed
to “mind control” because, instead of preventing the patient
from carrying out a desired behavior or forcing an undesired
behavior, it allows the patient to act on his choices with less
difficulty.
The same argument also holds for DBS treatments of psychi-
atric diseases like depression (Lozano et al., 2008). One might
make the argument that being a psychiatric disease, depression is
classically described as a disease of the mind. Therefore, if one can
control the patient’s disease one must be controlling the patient’s
mind, i.e., committing an act of mind control. The proposed
criteria would exclude this case of mind control because, as in the
case of DBS for the treatment of essential tremor, the effect on
the patient was with the patient’s consent, and, thus, it fails the
Consent Criterion.
NON-OBVIOUS TEST CASE
While it is important that the criteria capture one’s intuition,
they should also go beyond and clarify murkier territory. The
criteria should be able to help one examine non-obvious cases and
arrive at a reasoned judgment about their status as mind control
or as non-mind control. Thus, the criteria above are especially
useful when attempting to identify borderline instances of mind
control.
Turning again to the past, consider the following case of an
experiment conducted by Jose Delgado and his collaborators
Drs. Obrador and Martin-Rodriguez into the stimulation of the
caudate nucleus of an epileptic patient:
As shown by direct observation and by analysis of the record,
within 30 s after application of caudate stimulation there was a
significant change in the patient’s mood. During controls, he was
reserved, his conversation was limited and he was concerned about
his illness. After caudate stimulation, his spontaneous verbaliza-
tion increased more than twofold and contained expressions of
friendliness and euphoric behavior which culminated in jokes and
loud singing in a gay cante jondo style, accompanied by tapping
with his right hand, which lasted for about 2 min. The eupho-
ria continued for about 10 min and then the patient gradually
reverted to his usual, more reserved attitude. This increase in
friendliness was observed following three different stimulation
sessions of the caudate, and did not appear when other areas were
tested (Valenstein, 1973).
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In the above description, the researchers are attempting to
correct the patient’s epilepsy with the use of electrical current. In
testing one of their hypothesized targets, they managed to elicit a
strong behavioral effect. The patient’s attitude changed from quiet
reserve to expressive joviality, i.e., the researchers significantly
altered the patient’s behavior and in doing so satisfied the Result
Criterion, as well as the Consent Criterion because they did not
have the patient’s consent to alter his behavior in this manner. At
this point one could argue, correctly, that this was an accident.
The experimenters had no a priori knowledge that the patient
would respond to stimulation in this fashion so it could not have
been their intention to do so; thus, they failed to satisfy the Intent
Criterion.
The essential issue arose when the stimulation was repeated,
three different times, without any documentation that the patient
wanted to have his personality manipulated in this manner.
While this might, at first, seem like nit picking, it is impor-
tant to appreciate that the experimenters now had reason to
believe that the behavior of the individual would be affected in
a specific way. When they activated the stimulation and pro-
duced the anticipated effect, it was purposeful. In this way, the
experimenters fulfilled the Intent Criterion. As in the case of
a schizophrenic patient subjected to the self-stimulation exper-
iment above, it seems clear that the researchers’ motivation
was intellectual curiosity and not malice. Nevertheless, both of
these cases demonstrate that malice is not necessary for mind
control.
SERENDIPITY AND MIND CONTROL
The above case raises a critical question with regard to several
recently published studies in which subjects received DBS in
an effort to treat one illness, but instead saw serendipitous
improvement in a comorbid psychiatric illness. One serendip-
itous discovery was reported by Kuhn et al. (2007) who
attempted to treat a man with anxiety disorder by placing
DBS electrodes into his nucleus accumbens, a major compo-
nent in the reward circuit of the mammalian brain. While
the patient’s anxiety did not improve, he did see significant
remission in his alcohol dependency, leading the group to pro-
pose the target as a potential treatment for alcoholism and
addiction.
A second example comes from Hamani et al. (2008) who
used DBS of the hypothalamus in an effort to help control a
patient with morbid obesity. Although the patient continued
to gain weight (a fact left out of the primary article and only
included in the online supplemental materials) he did experience
a flashback while receiving intra-operative test stimulation. This
led the researchers to do a battery of studies to determine if
stimulation to the same area at a lower level, which did not
cause a flashback, could improve memory. To the surprise of
the researchers, they found a significant increase in the subject’s
verbal memory. Based on this finding the authors proposed the
anterior fornix (a structure adjacent to the hypothalamus) as a
target for the treatment of dementia and began enrolling patients
to study it further.
Finally, Israël et al. (2010) describes a case in which a woman
was receiving DBS of the subgenual cingulate gyrus (Cg25) for
treatment of depression. The authors noted that, although the
patient continued to have relapses of major depression, she
stopped experiencing symptoms related to a significant comorbid
anorexia nervosa. Based on the remarkable improvement the
patient experienced, despite her less remarkable improvement for
her depression, the authors proposed Cg25 as a target for the
treatment of anorexia nervosa.
There are several curious similarities among the cases above.
First, the intended effect of DBS was either not seen or was
not particularly robust. Second, the serendipitous effect on the
comorbid illness (or enhancement of normal faculties in the
case of anterior fornix stimulation for memory) was remark-
able. Third, based on these cases all authors proposed that the
stimulated sites be tested as targets for monotherapy for the
responding illness. A final common feature was that at no point
did the authors describe the patient receiving informed consent
for the managing of the comorbid illness or for enhancing the
patient’s faculties (Earp et al., 2014), with DBS. The only paper
that commented on informed consent was Hamani et al. which
stated:
The procedure was approved by the University Health Net-
work Research Ethics Board, and written informed consent was
obtained under the guidance of a hospital ethicist, who served as
a consent monitor. The basis of the approval for this man was
the refractory nature of the obesity, the exhaustion of reasonable
therapeutic alternatives, and the possibility of reducing the health
risks of chronic obesity should the intervention prove successful
(Hamani et al., 2008).
In the passage above, the authors clearly stated a reasonable
approach for obtaining informed consent for the treatment of
the patient’s obesity. However, they did not describe receiving
the patient’s consent for the use of DBS in order to enhance
his verbal memory. Despite not reporting the patient’s informed
consent to have his memory augmented, they proceeded to run
a battery of tests on the patient’s memory function and, fur-
thermore, did not mention discontinuing the treatment once it
became apparent that DBS was not effective for the treatment of
obesity.
The above cases raises a critical question: were these examples
of “mind control”? The patients had unexpected alterations in
their behavior and it appears, based on the descriptions of the
cases, that the DBS was continued primarily because of these
unexpected results. Further, the authors did not report that they
repeated the informed consent process for the serendipitous
alteration in the patient’s behavior. The authors of this paper
could conjecture that, once the researchers realized the unex-
pected effect DBS was having on their patient they consulted
with him or her and received his or her blessing to continue
therapy. Nonetheless, if they (or others) had not secured the
consent of their patients for these new treatment indications, then
they would be satisfying the Result (behavior change) Consent
(happening without patient’s consent) and Intent (behavioral
change was the goal of DBS) criteria of mind control. Therefore,
it is critical for clinicians and researchers to secure additional
consent in the case of serendipitous therapeutic benefit in order
to avoid the charge that they are committing an act of mind
control.
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CONCLUSION
We have argued that DBS is not synonymous with mind control;
however, if not appropriately safeguarded, patients can be vic-
tims of mind control even without malice on the part of those
controlling the stimulation, especially in the case of serendipi-
tous treatment of co-morbid psychiatric illnesses. While many
instances of mind control are easily identified, there are certain
instances where the distinction is more ambiguous. This paper
outlines a clear set of criteria to help more effectively and reliably
clarify those ambiguous cases. For an act to be considered mind
control it must alter the individual’s behavior (Result Criterion)
without his consent (Consent Criterion) and this alteration to
the behavior of the individual must be the goal of the person
or group controlling the alteration (Intent Criterion). Relying on
the researchers’ or clinicians’ intuitions alone is not sufficient
because those intuitions might easily become clouded such as in
the serendipitous discovery of an effect of DBS. It is, therefore,
important to note that in cases of serendipitous treatments of
psychiatric illness patients also require the explicit consent for
the treatment of the co-morbid illness, or else the case would
qualify as mind control. It is the intention of the authors to
minimize the risk of such accidents by clarifying the underlying
concepts.
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